Success and Innovation in Planning – Creating Public Value

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Executive Summary

Introduction

This report illustrates how places can be transformed through planning intervention. Planners and the planning system have to address many ‘wicked problems’ that arise when changes are proposed to local environments and places that defy easy solutions. Inevitably, almost any project deemed a success by some will be considered a failure by others, but through considering a number of case studies we show how planning can make a difference to economies, environments and livelihoods. We also draw general lessons from the cases for planning practice.

The research which informs this report identifies innovation in the planning field – where people have tried to do things differently in a wide range of innovative ways. We link the idea of innovation with notions of success and transformation: ‘success’ because innovation is not necessarily always positive and there are many everyday successes of a routine nature in planning; ‘transformation’ because it suggests that some material, enduring difference has been made through planning intervention.

We develop a number of lessons from the case studies to show what good planning can achieve and what others engaged in it can learn.

Who should read this?

This report is aimed at a wide range of people involved in how places are planned, from those actively involved in planning practice, to those from a policy background seeking to influence the future of planning policy and practice. It is also hoped the report will contribute to academic debate on the role of planning and its relevance in the twenty-first century.

Key messages for policy and practice

The planning system

1. The statutory planning system can be very useful but it operates best when the political will exists to use it and to achieve clear goals, for example the case studies of the London Olympics and Manchester city centre regeneration. Endless tinkering with the formal system is not conducive to innovation, however.
2. Resources, particularly public money, are important to secure public goods and values, for example the case studies of the Salford Quays regeneration and Manchester city centre.
3. Land ownership is important; innovation and long term success of development is dramatically enhanced by taking a longer term approach to developing land, for example the case studies of Newhall and the Sherwood Energy Village.
4. Creating a new institutional space, such as through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) can be helpful, especially where institutional goals are clear, for example the case studies of the London Olympics and the Grainger Town Partnership.
5. Effective stakeholder involvement throughout and at an early stage of any project or plan is often significant, for example the case studies of Bristol localism and the Grainger Town Partnership.
Promoting innovation

6. *Experimentation and space for risk-taking* is important. An organisation may not always get it right first time, there needs to be (political) space for a degree of failure, for example the case studies of the Hadrian’s Wall Plan and Rugby development management reform.

7. *Learn from good practice*, from locally and beyond, but be reflective about what may be transferable, for example the case studies of Manchester city centre and the Grainger Town Partnership.

8. *A long history of attention* to a subject – a place or plan – is important in generating the knowledge and relationships that lead to genuine transformation. Sometimes this can help in rapid transformations building on the knowledge accumulated over time, in others a ‘slow’ approach to planning pays dividends in terms of quality of outcomes, for example the case studies of the Hadrian’s Wall Plan and Gateshead Quays.

9. Innovation has to be managed: a process is needed to routinize and embed new thinking into practices, for example the case study of the Hadrian’s Wall Plan.

Strategic and integrated approach

10. A *holistic (integrated, comprehensive) understanding* of place helps to bring different issues together to overcome policy ‘silos’ and secure public value beyond the planning system, for example the case studies of the Hadrian’s Wall Plan and Marine spatial planning.

11. Projects work best when they are appropriately and *creatively framed* with *clear and consistent strategic goals* but with flexibility in implementation, for example the case studies of Gateshead Quays and Manchester city centre.

12. *Urban design*, both in the detail of development but also in wider masterplanning processes, especially articulated through codes and frameworks can be very important for success, for example the case studies of Manchester city centre and Newhall.

Building capacity

13. How ideas are *communicated* is highly significant in securing support and legitimacy for action, for example the case studies of TAYplan and Bristol localism.

14. Paying attention to building a *civic capacity*1 to contribute and underpin place governance work is important for the knowledge and values it brings and for better implementation, for example the case studies of the Grainger Town Partnership and Bristol localism.

15. *Technical skills and knowledge* are vital. In our cases this is often provided by professional planners drawing on codified and tacit knowledge. This can relate to legal aspects, the design of governance processes, and specialist advice such as in urban design, for example the case studies of Manchester city centre and Gateshead Quays.

16. *Public sector capacity* is very important to facilitate deliberation about what might be done in a place and to carry the memory of what has been tried before, for example the case studies of Salford Quays and Manchester city centre regeneration.

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1 ‘Civic capacity’ is the capacity of individuals to be active as citizens and work together to solve collective problems. In communities, it is often strongly related to the long-term approach of local government to engaging with citizens.
Implications for policy-makers

This report, and more particularly the case studies highlighted within it, show how innovative the planning sector can be when given the opportunity, freedom and resources. The problem is that this does not happen as often as it could, or should. Even with the recent championing of localism, England in particular still has one of the most centralised planning systems in the world. In addition, recent policy decisions by the Coalition Government have resulted in removal of much of the strategic planning capacity from sub-national institutions. There have been a number of reports over the past 18 months (Heseltine, 2013, and RSA, 2014, for example) advocating greater devolved strategic planning powers to regions and below. This report should be seen as providing more evidence for the greater devolution of planning powers to the lowest possible level. This will allow joined-up, long-term planning of the types which have been highlighted in this report.

By devolving more strategic planning powers away from Whitehall in particular there will also be opportunities for the planning process to be used to tackle wider societal challenges: ageing, economic growth and climate change for example, not just directly through the built environment but indirectly by building in joined up service delivery. Further, such devolution would allow planners to develop tailored solutions which recognise the cultural and social context in which planning decisions are made, and to engage the communities affected by the changes. By allowing devolved, transparent and participatory decision-making at a level appropriate for the decision in question, the legitimacy of any innovation can be established. As argued in the report, the success of public innovation should not be judged in the same way as private innovation. To succeed, public innovation needs to be seen to have a legitimate process, as well as delivering the required outcome.

This devolution of powers must also be accompanied by devolution of resources. The case studies highlighted in this report illustrate that a critical factor in the success of any innovation is continuity of vision and leadership. This can only happen if there is continuity of resources. This report also therefore endorses the City Growth Commission’s (RSA, 2014) call for multi-year financing without ring-fencing. This would enable long term strategic planning to deliver the infrastructure, environmental benefits and housing areas need to grow and thrive.
Methodology

This report details the findings of a research project conducted in 2014 by the Global Urban Research Unit at Newcastle University for the RTPI. Through the deployment of a Delphi methodology, a number of examples of innovation and success in planning from the past 25 years were garnered and ranked from an elite sample of respondents. Desk-based research narrowed down the examples and these are detailed and analysed herein around three groupings: projects; plans; and management. Despite the breadth of the cases, and in some instances their uniqueness, a clear series of messages emerges concerning: the importance of the formal planning system; the ability to innovate in place governance; the significance of planning in developing strategy and in coordinating with other policy sectors; and the importance of local civic and institutional capacity in achieving planning goals and securing public value.
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1. **PLANNING AND SOCIETAL CHALLENGES**

Planning systems provide a set of responses to some of society’s biggest social challenges. Planning has been in the frontline of many of these since its inception in governmental terms in the twentieth century, for example the need for quality affordable housing, for cities that are accessible to all: and, the need to provide land for infrastructure and development. Other challenges have returned with redefined importance such as the need to maintain public health standards through improving air quality and promoting healthy environments. And others are rather newer, such as addressing climate change and an ageing society, both of which redefine what we might mean by good, successful planning.

All of these challenges have significant dimensions in which place and space matter. Planning is about place-making and about paying attention to the relationships between human and non-human activities in space, that is, spatial relations. In our contemporary societies, with their complex relationships and mobilities, place and space need to be at the heart of policy-making as social life, business relations and our interaction with the natural environment are tied into the places where we live, work and visit (Adams and Watkins, 2014).Addressing such relations through place-making involves bringing together many spheres of activity and fields of public policy as these affect place qualities and people’s experience of them. This coordinative challenge requires some kind of ‘integrated’ or ‘holistic’ perspective of what is going on within which specific issues, problems and potential interventions are positioned. The impetus for intervention often comes from deep conflicts over what to value and whose ideas about the future get to count. Finding ways forward may involve imagining futures in different ways (visioning), co-ordinating disparate agencies in new ways, creating new kinds of places or helping them to emerge, and developing techniques and management tools to improve efficiency and effectiveness. This work is not easy, and often takes a long time to achieve. It involves professional expertise, but also political judgement and often the involvement of economic and civil society groups keen to promote particular values and projects. Our research highlights the significance of planning systems and local government in particular in such a broad project and thus in driving success and innovation locally.

Planning systems have been created over the past century in order to set some ground rules for this activity, particularly as regards how land and property are used and developed. Typically, such systems have formal mechanisms to encourage strategic visioning, to enable complex projects to proceed through site assembly and infrastructure support, and to manage the ongoing flow of modifications to the built environment. Planning systems always have a legal or quasi-legal base, as they inherently affect property rights. The declared intentions of such systems are to promote public value while enabling individual interests to proceed. What constitutes public value is always open to contestation and the balance between public value and private interest always difficult to achieve. But ideas of public value can help to define what planning can achieve, focused on a range of often hard to measure factors over the short and long term. It can stand as an alternative to narrow measures of performance associated with the new public management (Coats and Passmore, 2008).

**Contemporary challenges for UK planning**

Given the difficulties of measuring many aspects of a public value and the uncertainty in predicting such outcomes, it is not surprising that planning systems, and the planning experts and officials who play a major role in making such systems work, are continually criticised for their actions in the face of many competing values and opinions. Part of the criticism is inherent in the task. The Pareto optimum ‘win-win’ situation is often very unlikely. However, part of the criticism arises from the structure of the system and how it is practised. Three factors in particular affect the performance of the planning system in the UK.
Firstly, our government structure is highly centralised and organised into policy delivery sectors (the ‘silos’) which make co-ordination in specific places difficult (place governance has also been undermined by outsourcing/privatisation and ‘agencification’, that is, shifting responsibilities and functions from government to other public bodies). This situation can be exacerbated where national political priorities are imposed across the system, despite the very different social, economic and environmental conditions in different parts of our devolved nations. The situation is made even more complex where local political boundaries bear little relationship to the relations and borders which people acknowledge in the flow of their activities and perceptions.

Secondly, attempts to reform and re-focus our planning systems in recent years have been narrowly focused on crude performance measures designed to improve efficiency and on achieving single objectives, notably increasing housing permissions (as opposed to the different issue of housing supply), without attention to the many dimensions which create place quality. Reduced funding to local government and national performance demands have tended to create local organisational cultures focused on meeting these nationally-set targets rather than finding ways of improving place qualities in discussion with citizens and other stakeholders. The accelerated financialisation of aspects of public planning in recent years is not wholly bad, but accounting for long term public benefit is difficult within such a framework. Specific actions, such as charging for pre-application discussion, disadvantages community groups and small businesses. In this context, innovation may be limited to finding ways to achieve these external targets rather than delivering enduring place qualities and creating public value.

Third, the planning system has drifted into a more quasi-legal form which stifles creativity, particularly in terms of plan-making. Plan-making especially has become entrenched in its own overly bureaucratic silo from which local planners find it hard to escape. When coupled with the intense local political debates over land allocation it is not hard to see why we received no nominations of innovative, successful statutory plans in England in the timeframe.

Yet despite these limitations, our cases show that many municipal planners and planning consultants, working often over considerable periods with local politicians, other stakeholders and citizens, have been able to make a positive difference. They have promoted and enabled projects which have created new and valued place qualities. They have helped to generate strategic visions which inspire others to shape and co-ordinate their projects to generate public value as well as individual gain. They have re-organised practices to provide a responsive, efficient and fair development management service.

Our aim in this report is to focus on these ‘success stories’, to counteract the continual critique to which planning systems are subject, particularly in the UK. It provides an antidote to what the late Sir Peter Hall famously wrote about in *Great Planning Disasters*, some of which, over time, turned out to be more successful than was initially the case. Our focus is to show how planning experts, mostly working within public agencies and formal local planning authorities, have been innovative in searching for more effective ways of producing good outcomes in terms of place qualities and public value, despite the inevitable constraints imposed upon them by wider contexts. Examples of success and of innovation matter in defending planning against narrow, sectional attacks. Such attacks are rarely well-founded these days. They typically proceed by assertion rather than evidence and are often founded on a lack of understanding. As the cases show, there is much to celebrate in UK planning, despite the constraints highlighted above. In the key messages and conclusions sections we show what might be learnt for policy and practice and what might unleash greater levels of innovation in UK planning.
Defining success and innovation

Terms such as ‘success’ and ‘innovation’ have somewhat elastic and subjective meanings which often differ depending on the context in which the terms are deployed. Innovation is perhaps the easier of the two to reduce to a more objective meaning. Innovation, and the closely related term invention, is perhaps best understood within classical economic theory. For example, the work of Joseph Schumpeter has greatly influenced theories of innovation since his original thesis on innovation in 1934. He argued that economic development is driven by innovation through a dynamic process in which new technologies replace the old, a process he labelled ‘creative destruction’. In Schumpeter’s view, ‘radical’ innovations create major disruptive changes, whereas ‘incremental’ innovations continuously advance the process of change. Schumpeter (1934) proposed a list of five types of innovations:

i. Introduction of new products;
ii. Introduction of new methods of production;
iii. Opening of new markets;
iv. Development of new sources of supply for raw materials or other inputs;
v. Creation of new market structures in an industry.

This understanding of innovation as some form of Darwinian natural selection has had a significant influence on neoliberal policy development and is perhaps at the heart of many of the brickbats thrown at planning. Planning is seen as a challenge to free markets, which are seen as the means of innovation, in property markets for example. Free market policy orthodoxy sees a role for state intervention only in strictly limited circumstances, in the face of market failure or an imbalance in power between those participating in the market. However, this ignores the often important, sometimes critical role that the state plays in private-sector innovation, for example in making initial investments in research and development or in shaping and regulating markets (Mazzucato, 2013). There is also a focus on technical and scientific products and processes within mainstream innovation policy which often overlooks innovation which does not conform to this narrow definition, for example in business models or services (NESTA, 2007).

Others have created alternative understandings of innovation, less focused on market values. Moulaert (2010) for example argues that: “Social innovation... is about the satisfaction of basic needs and changes in social relations within empowering social processes” (p.10). In this and other models of innovation it is not the market that drives the process but people’s inherent wish to live more sociable and rewarding lives.

Similar ideas can be found in the public policy literature. Here, innovation has been promoted as the solution to ‘wicked problems’, that is, those problems that have no clear or permanent solutions (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Such ideas of innovation take into account the nature of modern governance recognising that power is more diffuse than previously, and so action takes place in multi-level, multi-agency contexts. Thus Sorenson and Torfing (2011) argue innovation is defined as an: “…intentional and proactive process that involves the generation and practical adoption and spread of new and creative ideas, which aim to produce a qualitative change in a specific context” (p.849). It is this definition that we use in selecting our case studies for scrutiny. As well as an outcome, innovation can relate to a process, one that calls for roles and skills that may not be clear at the outset – for instance, the ability to envision new solutions to problems, the ability to design and participate in creative and collaborative processes, and the ability to deal with potential risks and resistance to new solutions (Osborne and Brown, 2011).
Innovation in planning

Innovation in planning and in public services more generally face a number of challenges not necessarily encountered when engaging in innovation within the private sector. Whilst simplistic linear models of innovation have been challenged, a relatively small set of stakeholders are envisaged in innovation processes. The primary stakeholders are the consumers and the owners of the business implementing the innovation. The primary forum for judging success or failure of the innovation is the market place.

Contrast this with the situation in planning. If we consider an innovation at the early stages of its lifecycle, when it just about ready to be implemented, there is a much more complex web of stakeholders with an interest in different aspects of the innovation. Overlaying the straightforward relationship between the consumer of the product or service and the local authority there are a number of other stakeholder interests that need to be considered. Kitchen (2007) for example identifies ten customer ‘clusters’ which are likely to be engaged in a complex planning project such as the creation of a strategic plan. As has been highlighted above, planning is not just a about a didactic relationship between the consumer and the planning authority, planning is about creating a sense of place and about balancing the interest of all those who live, work, visit and value a place. Overlaying this is a political set of interests at the local and national level. Planning is one of the most emotive subjects in local politics and political controversy over certain interventions, as well as the regular changing of political regimes in local government, may stifle potential innovations as they emerge.

Any innovation in planning must therefore pass this additional test of political legitimacy over and above the more traditional market based measures of success. The key questions to ask when determining the success or failure of any planning innovation must therefore be: Is the innovation more efficient and productive than established practice; and, Does it help to deliver ‘public value’? What then does this mean in terms of a framework for innovation in planning? One thing we can say so that many planning innovations are several of the types derived from Table 1 where a new service may be accompanied by new processes and organisational change.

There are various models, frameworks and typologies of innovation than can be drawn upon to develop a framework for innovation in planning. Some models such as Hartley (2005) try to differentiate the type of innovation and have a focus which goes beyond the tradition typology of innovation such as that outlined by Schumpeter (1934), as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Innovation types

Adapted from Hartley (2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Public sector example</th>
<th>Planning example</th>
<th>Case study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Product</td>
<td>New products</td>
<td>New instrumentation in hospitals</td>
<td>Eco-towns Pedestrianisation</td>
<td>CS7 – Sherwood Energy Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New legal tools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>New ways in which services are provided</td>
<td>Online tax self-assessment forms</td>
<td>Planning Portal</td>
<td>CS12 – Rugby Development Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process</td>
<td>New procedures, organisational structures, systems</td>
<td>Administrative reorganisations</td>
<td>Neighbourhood planning</td>
<td>CS9 – Marine Spatial Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>New contexts, customers or partners</td>
<td>Connexions services for young people</td>
<td>Outsourcing</td>
<td>CS8 – Hadrian’s Wall Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>New goals, purposes or values</td>
<td>Community policing, foundation hospitals</td>
<td>‘Sustainable Development’</td>
<td>CS11 – Bristol Localism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>New democratic institutions and forms of participation</td>
<td>Area forums, Devolved government</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Planning</td>
<td>CS4 – Grainger Town Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical</td>
<td>New language, concepts and definitions</td>
<td>Congestion charging, carbon tax</td>
<td>Urban Renaissance Localism</td>
<td>CS9 – Marine Spatial Planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The typology from Hartley expands the types of innovations to include more intangible innovation such as strategic or rhetorical innovations. This expanded typology is a useful way to think of the many, often hidden, ways in which innovation is present within planning. In the final two columns of the table we have sought to give examples from planning in general and from our case studies to set the context if innovation in planning. This is not an exact science as many of the case studies demonstrate the complex nature of innovation and are not easy to pigeon hole into these typologies. An illustrative example of this would be special purpose vehicles (SPV) which are prominent in a number of the case studies. SPVs typically imply a departure from mainstream practice, often applied to a specific geographical area. The idea is not innovative but they can exhibit unique characteristics, in how they are structured for example. This highlights the limitations of typologies such as these in fully understanding the complex relationships involved in planning innovation. The next section seeks to outline an alternative framework which seeks to situate the innovation process within the wider policy and social context it inhabits.
A framework for innovation in planning

The typology outlined in Figure 1 attempts to bring together various theoretical and applied elements in innovation theory. It adopts a ‘logic model’ (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2004) to establish a complete framework for all aspects of the innovation process. Whilst the logic model is inherently a linear one there is an acknowledgement that this may be a necessary oversimplification. As Lekhi (2007) points out, innovation is a complex and chaotic process with many starting points and circular paths. However, the planning system sits within a political and legislative framework which will impose a degree of order on the process and require certain steps to be taken at a particular stage of the process. It is for this reason the logic model is perhaps the best foundation on which to build a framework for innovation in planning.
Figure 1: Framework for innovation in planning

**Innovation Phase**
- What type of innovation is needed:
  - Product
  - Service
  - Process
  - Position
  - Strategic
  - Governance
  - Rhetorical
- Is a combination of more than one innovation type needed?
- Is it better to adopt incremental or radical change?

**Understanding Phase**
- What is the problem that the organisation faces?
  - Internal or external challenge?
  - Societal or specific?
- What is the goal or objective for the change (framing the problem)?
- What knowledge is needed, how can it be obtained and validated?

**Adoption Phase**
- How can the innovation be put accepted by all stakeholders?
- How can failure be accepted and accommodated?

**Implementation Phase**
- How can the changes be established and embedded?
- How can the experience be used to inform future change?

Who has the authority to provide leadership?

Who should be involved and when?

What other innovative practices are there in other areas, sectors or in development that can be adopted or adapted?

How can the legitimacy of the changes be established?

How to communicate the nature of the innovation?

How to communicate the innovation?

How can experience be shared with others?

How to measure success?

Who will judge success?

At each phase there may be a need to reflect and revise basic assumptions in light of new knowledge.
Phase one of the model is the understanding phase. A clear challenge or problem must be identified which requires an innovative solution. Change for the sake of change is never good policy and in relation to public services it can be divisive. Indeed recent history is characterised by rapid change in the context for local planning intervention. These factors may in themselves lead to innovation as planners are forced to do things differently, but it also provides a very unstable context in which innovation might arise, especially if led from the public sector (Gunn and Hillier, 2012). Defining the ‘challenge’ often takes time. For example, while the challenge of delivering the Olympics was well understood at the start of the process, a focus on legacy and of transformational long-term urban change, emerged through the phases of developing the bid and thinking about the urban context for the London Games. In other cases, identifying the precise focus for the intervention requires a less-defined phase of exploration – ‘what might be done with this place/site/groups of interests’ given what we know?’ There then often follows a reflexive learning process whereby the very object of planning’s attention becomes defined and an approach identified based on the capacities and resources available.

This highlights the significance of identifying the relevant knowledge needed to intervene. Both technical knowledge – of planning procedures, urban trends and so on – and tacit knowledge of the fine grain of local conditions, are significant in most of our cases. The trick in many cases is in the blending of different knowledge and knowledge types. The ‘project’ cases that follow provide good examples. It is here that UK planning innovation will tend to happen given its maturity as a policy sector. Planning as an applied discipline is fundamentally concerned with knowledge into action.

Similarly in phase two of the model, the innovation phase, several types of intervention may be necessary. Bristol’s localism policy requires changes to organisational structures and indeed culture, as well as process change which in turn shape future ‘products; in this case plans. Thus in planning there is a relatively standard set of ‘components’, but the innovation comes in their combinations and in the success in knowing the context in which the combination is deployed. Indeed, while we carry in our heads the idea of innovation as things that are entirely new, nearly all innovation is ‘combinatorial’ these days, bringing together established things in new ways or in different contexts.

The third and fourth phases are specific to public policy innovation in general and planning in particular. It is at these later stages of the innovation process that market mechanisms for legitimising and approving the innovation are replaced by the need for democratic legitimacy of any innovative change. There is a wider set of stakeholders who are concerned with the legitimacy of any innovation. There are also a range of processes through which the legitimacy of any innovation can be determined: for example, referendum in the case of neighbourhood plans; meeting central government targets in the case of land use planning; or improved standards of living and wellbeing in the case of regeneration projects. Critical to any innovation in planning succeeding is the need for the innovation to be accepted as a legitimate change by the relevant stakeholders involved. The question of legitimacy is a complex one as it involves the legitimacy of the process, the institutions managing the process and the representatives providing the leadership (Davoudi and Cowie, 2013). Procedural legitimacy relates to the conduct of the institution, how open and transparent the process is and how widely the relevant stakeholders are able to participate in the process. Institutional legitimacy can be derived from a higher authority, delegated legitimacy or else derived from its accountability to the constituency it serves. Finally, and closely linked to institutional legitimacy, is the legitimacy of any representatives authorised to make decisions.

The final phase, although in reality this is a deeply iterative and cyclical process, in the process of innovation in planning is the implementation of the innovation and reflections on how it should
proceed. This phase takes us back to the start of the process as ideas are reviewed and indeed may travel to new areas or policy sectors. A critical element of this stage in the process of innovation is the establishment of leadership and capacity to carry the innovation through and it this persistence that often marks the innovations here from many similar projects that may not have endured. Thus strong, collaborative leadership and/or the establishment of structures which could deliver the innovation underpin the regeneration of Manchester, Gateshead Quays, Portsmouth and the London Olympics. New forms of plans often show this process vividly. In the Hadrian’s Wall case that follows, the first plan is relatively timid but provided a legitimate platform for future action that could be bolder given the buy-in from the relevant stakeholders and the learning that preparing the first plan entailed.²

As well as directly producing innovation of the various types as set out in Table 1 (first order affects), the planning system also created space to allow innovation to happen elsewhere (second order affects). This is particularly the case in domains closely related to planning for example architecture and infrastructure development. Successful planning allows space for innovative building design to be achieved (for example, the Millennium Dome) and for novel and allow new infrastructure to be developed (for example, Crossrail).

**Success in planning**

This leads us on to the next element, how to measure success? We link innovation to success to provide a normative orientation to our work. Success has the distinction of being highly subjective, even more so than ‘innovation’! One person’s success is another’s failure. When asked some years later about the cases in his 1980 book, *Great Planning Disasters*, the late Sir Peter Hall suggested that many would now be considered successes. This statement illustrates the time-dependent nature of notions of success in that it often takes some time for the true value of a project to be realised and also that different generations will impose different ideas of success, consider Hall’s inner London urban motorway building of the 1970s as one example. Policies and plans can also outlive their usefulness in the minds of some stakeholders. Green belts were one nomination of success we received and we can see it in these terms but it is also a policy which is now being questioned as providing more problems for planning than benefits. It has been a success in terms of limiting urban sprawl but not in ensuring a quality landscape. It has also resulted in unintended consequences such as skewing house prices and leading to leapfrogging with more development further from the urban core than is necessarily sustainable. We see success as a set of outcomes broadly experienced as positive by those concerned with a place and its qualities, and one whereby the efficient securing of public value is clearly achieved.

To this end we have not sought to define success in any particular way but relied predominantly on the views of an expert panel to nominate and determine their own examples of planning innovation and success. This has resulted in some examples focused on process and others where the outcome was the critical element and a select few where both elements were considered successful. We group our ‘successes’ according to whether they are predominantly projects, strategies or regulation/management.

**Methodology**

Our research sits within an interpretive tradition (for example, Yanow, 1996, Wagenaar, 2011, Healey, 2015). Such a tradition recognises that determining matters of success, transformation or innovation are not fixed but are matters of judgement. One way to secure reliability and robustness in such instances is to look to the communities of practice that exist within a field. We thus

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² Similar things were said of Scotland’s National Planning Framework (Vigar, 2009).
developed a list of 100 experts who could be said to be authoritative voices in the field of planning. These consisted of academics, bloggers/commentators, former past presidents of the RTPI among others. This ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992) was mobilised within a loose Delphi Technique framework to identify a long list of possible case studies.

The Delphi survey technique is an inductive research methodology which seeks to develop a consensus of opinion between experts. The first stage in the process was to establish our panel of experts. One hundred planning professionals and commentators were selected by the project partners including past presidents of the RTPI, planning consultants, academics and other significant planning stakeholders. The Delphi survey was conducted in two rounds. The first round was a series of open questions asking the expert panel to nominate up to three exemplars of successful and innovative planning where projects were implemented or significantly prominent in a twenty-five year period to 2013. This period was chosen to be most relevant to future planning given the dramatic shifts in the governance environment in which contemporary planning practice is conducted. Twenty-eight nominations were received. The expert making the nomination was asked to give a brief description of the nomination and explain why they felt the nomination was successful and innovative. This list of 28 is of course not comprehensive or exclusive and readers would no doubt suggest others. These potential case studies were then narrowed down in a second round.

The second round Delphi survey consisted of a summary of each of the nominations. The expert panel was then asked to score each of the nominations as to how successful and innovative it was on a scale of 1 to 3 (1 being not at all successful/innovative, 3 being extremely successful/innovative). The questions did not link the two concepts, that is, it asked if a nomination was either innovative, successful or even both. The expert also had the option to not score the nomination if they were not sufficiently familiar with it. There were differences between scores associated with success and scores associated with innovation. A number of the nominations scored highly in one or other of those categories but not always in both. We thus made a judgement about which cases to include but have favoured the ‘innovation’ score as we think these are where greater interest lies.

Following completion of the second round of the Delphi survey a case study was undertaken for each of the top 15 nominations. This involved desk based research reviewing academic and other literature as well as any policy or other documents relating to the proposal including lists of awards such as those of the RTPI. This material was developed further through a telephone interview with a key stakeholder in each of the nominations and, in some instances, a visit to the nomination itself. We have narrowed the cases to 12 in the final analysis.

There are some notable absences from our list of cases. There are no transport examples, although one might think of the reintroduction of tram systems in many cities in the period, the creation of the National Cycle Network by Sustrans, or the congestion charge in London. Large and on-going regeneration projects such as London’s South Bank are also missing. There were few statutory plans nominated and Scotland’s National Planning Framework and the London Plan could all have made an alternative list. Similarly community-led projects are not much represented here. The Community Land Trust movement has gained significant traction in the past decade as have various community housing initiatives such as Lammas in Wales where innovative planning frameworks have underpinned socially progressive outcomes. Nevertheless the cases do reveal again and again the sorts of things that underpin success and innovation in planning. The next section documents the cases with an emphasis on these factors. It is structured into three sections: projects; plans; and, management/regulation.
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SECTION A: PROJECTS

Case study 1 – The London Olympics and Paralympics Games and their built legacy

Description

During the nomination process the London Olympics was the stand out winner with the expert panel. The Games took place in summer 2012 while the decision to host the games was taken seven years earlier. While there was inevitably a certain amount of preparatory work done for the bid, seven years represented a relatively small time window for the transformation of a 200-hectare site into the Olympic Park. It is worth noting however that much of the area has been subject to planning attention for some time with a lot of important thinking about, and plans for, the future of the Lea Valley for several years prior to its designation as the Olympic Park. The framing of the Olympic Park as part of the Thames Gateway regeneration through the London Plan was a significant part of this. Planning for the London Olympics could be seen as something of a unique set of circumstances, delivery of a mega-project to a tight, absolute deadline. However there are aspects of the process that can be used to inform other major regeneration projects elsewhere: not least that, despite the creation of a special purpose vehicle, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), to plan and develop the site, the use of the statutory planning system was fundamental to delivery.

The ODA was overseen by the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG) with the Government Olympic Executive (GOE), a unit within the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), providing a strong central government presence throughout, not least to oversee the spending of £9.3 billion of public money (the original budget for the Games was £2.4 billion). The site was spread across four local authorities, increasing the potential organisational complexity of the planning process. From the start there was a clear timetable for the planning process: 4 + 1 + 1. Four years to clear the site and build the infrastructure, one year to plan and test the infrastructure and the final year to deliver the Olympics. The plans for the site were approved prior to the submission of the bid to host the Games in September 2004. Extensive compulsory purchase orders were utilised subsequently and while much land was vacant or readily given up, several businesses and residents opposed the orders. Considerable upgrades to public transport were implemented in time for the games.

The London Legacy Development Corporation has acted as the planning authority for the area around and including Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park since April 2012. Any planning application made in the area must be submitted to them rather than to the local borough. The LLDC subsequently developed a three year ‘business plan’ (2013-16) to create an ‘urban district of housing and commercial development’ and to deliver the Queen Elizabeth Park which opened in April 2014.

Success

The nominations cited the various elements within the planning process leading up to the Olympics, the staging of the Olympic and Paralympic games and the regeneration and legacy following completion of the games as evidence of success. The Olympic Park was assembled using a range of planning tools. The use of compulsory purchase orders to assemble a single large tract of land is nothing new but is increasingly rare in UK planning. This has a flipside of course. Perhaps inevitably something was lost in the redevelopment of such a large area in a short space of time. Allotments, homes, sports facilities (somewhat ironically), businesses and a fine grain urban structure were all lost. Questions were asked about the way the site was completely cleared and while this undoubtedly made development easier it may not have been entirely necessary. While alternative locations were often found for many activities these were often more expensive or of lower quality.
The largest emergent criticism however is of gentrification. While the socio-economic transformation of the area was part of the project, the balance between the desires of big capital and real estate appears to be out of balance with local residents needs and wishes (Watt, 2013). New neighbourhoods are thus being built with less affordable housing than originally planned, and rather than positively planning for existing residents they are expected to benefit from the much-criticised ‘trickle down’ of economic benefits to them. It may be then that ten years hence we may see the legacy as a failure rather than success.

Innovation

The first innovation in the planning process was to have the legacy of the Games as a goal on a par with the delivery of the games themselves from the outset. In contrast to a number of previous games, perhaps with the exception of Barcelona, there was a clear vision of what should be left behind once the Games were over. Having an equal focus on the legacy resulted in a number of decisions being made. The Olympic Park itself was designed to be the first new public park within London for over 100 years. The area had a significant industrial legacy with attendant problems of contamination. A major part of the development works involved the reclamation of the land and rehabilitation of the waterways flowing through the site. The area has now been fully landscaped, opened to the public and appears to be well-used. Another outcome resulting from a focus on legacy from the outset was that a number of venues were designed to be temporary or have elements which would be reconfigured following the games. This avoided the burden of having underused or redundant buildings within the area. Certain key venues, the Olympic stadium, velodrome and the aquatic centre have all been retained and are now open for public use. These buildings serve as key anchors for the Olympic park and the initial indications are that they are popular with a wide audience. Other buildings, in particular the athletes’ village, were designed to be easily reconfigured to residential units once the games had finished. These residential blocks are being joined by further mixed use development around the site as a way of integrating the new developments into the
existing communities around the park. There is thus considerable design creativity embedded in this case study.

When thinking about the process of planning for the Olympics and its legacy collaboration in delivering the project is also noteworthy. This approach to multi-agency cooperation, particularly across multiple local authorities, through a special purpose vehicle, is now a model for other regeneration projects such as Old Oak Common/Park Royal in London. While it bears a resemblance to similar SPVs such as urban development corporations, in these instances local authorities were very much embedded in the delivery vehicle.

Conclusion

Global sporting mega-events are always controversial. London delivered an Olympic games that was widely acclaimed. The focus on legacy was able to draw on two decades of planning work in the Lea Valley and the wider Thames Gateway to develop a long-term vision for a new city district. In doing so the statutory planning system was used, rather than bypassed, as has been the case in other similar projects. The case thus shows what can be done with the system given the political will. The one issue on the horizon is whether the aims for ‘social sustainability’, particularly through the delivery of genuinely affordable housing and facilities for long-standing residents, will be realised.
The innovation in planning framework: London Olympics

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Case Study 2 – Salford Quays

Description

Salford Quays is an ex-industrial area of approx. 90ha which, in common with many industrial areas, had lost its purpose. Sitting at the end of the Manchester Ship Canal, Salford Quays had once been at the heart of industrial Manchester. By the 1980’s containerisation and increasing use of road transport had made the docks redundant. They closed in 1982 and the site was purchased by Salford Council. The original regeneration strategy was based around commercial, residential and recreational space with the first masterplan seeking to: “…create a new quarter of the City which has a unique character derived from the way in which all parts of the development are related to water” (Shepheard et al., 1985, para 3.2). The plan sought to provide a conducive environment for private sector investment without directly committing any resources. This was not at all successful with the area lacking any social or cultural identity and limited to a day time economy.

By the early 1990s a new strategy focused on culture and the arts but which included other activities. At this time the city was looking for a home for its extensive collection of Lowry Paintings and a proposal was put forward for a new gallery and performance space to form the heart of the regeneration effort.

Success

A new masterplan was produced in 1992 with the proposed Lowry Centre as its focus. After a few setbacks the Lowry Centre opened in 2000. Around the same time the area was reached by the Metrolink light transit system. As was commented at the time: “…the City is not rejecting its flat cap and pipe puffing past. Rather it has found confidence to build a new identity upon its industrial heritage.” (The Times, 29th April 2000).

As well as the Lowry Centre itself, on the other side of the canal the Imperial War Museum North (sitting in a neighbouring authority, Trafford) opened in 2002. The two iconic structures were joined by another impressive structure, a lifting footbridge. With these two cultural anchors and the growing connectivity of the area there was increasing confidence for the private sector to invest. There have now been a series of high specification residential developments which has added to the vibrancy of the area. Another key success in the regeneration plans was the inclusion of significant amount of public open space, particularly along the water front.

The final piece of the jigsaw was arguably the re-location of significant parts of the BBC to the new development, Media City Salford in 2010. Not only did this bring direct employment to the area but it has also attracted a number of smaller businesses which work in the media sector and sell products and services to the larger companies. The success has resulted from a flexibility to revise a strategic vision resulting in the transformation of an area into a centre for knowledge intensive industry.

Innovation

The history of Salford Quays could be seen to mirror the history of urban regeneration in general. The emergence of culture led regeneration as a strategic aim in the 1990s became refined to meet local opportunities. This flexibility was created by strong and stable leadership team with the Council and an ability to work with whichever national government was in place (Henderson et al., 2007). As in the Gateshead Quays case study (Case study 6) a track record of delivering regeneration projects helped Salford Council secure national government and private sector commitment. Early in the plan
a specific project team helped deliver this by coordinating the various elements of the regeneration and liaising with other stakeholders.

One element that perhaps distinguishes this case study from other waterfront regeneration projects was the ownership of the land. Once the docks closed in 1982, Salford Council purchased the whole site from the Manchester Ship Canal Company. This allowed the Council an additional level of control over the masterplanning of the area. Even where land was sold to third party developers a degree of control could be retained through development agreements or land covenants. A good example of how this ownership structure benefited the regeneration can be seen with the Lowry Centre where an outlet retail centre was included to provide a source of income to cover the running costs of the Lowry Centre.

Conclusion

Salford Quays shows that a focus on a defined place using a flexible long-term strategy pays dividends in securing public value in the longer term. A housing- and offices focused property-led regeneration programme built on the strengths of the area – the presence of a waterfront, a tram, and the potential to grow existing media industries. Public sector investment in cultural assets and the retention of land ownership by the public sector were key elements that facilitated economic transformation. The creation of an inter-disciplinary Project Team in the Council gave the project focus and facilitated successful delivery.

The innovation in planning framework: Salford Quays
Case study 3 – The regeneration of central Manchester

Description

It is perhaps hard now in the 2010s to think back to where northern English cities were in the 1980s and early 1990s. Many had fallen on hard times with a lot of vacant land in the city centre and suffering from intense pressure with regards to out of town retailing. Cities, as one civil servant of the time would have it, were ‘where problems went to get big’; irreversible decline was talked about.

What happened in Manchester from the early 1990s in part paved the way for a wider ‘urban renaissance’. In the 1980s the seeds for a recovery in the fortunes of central Manchester were made. The activities of the Central Manchester Development Corporation in East Manchester and a slow awakening of the regenerative possibilities of culture, in this case popular music in particular, were leading to a reversal in fortune. Manchester was a destination place for the young, students in particular. The City Council and others also began to focus on property-led regeneration. A script among the political elite developed around the possibilities of this which included celebrating the City’s cultural heritage in its many forms (Hebbert, 2010). The development and maintenance of this consistent policy line3 helped when an IRA bomb damaged 1200 buildings in the City Centre in 1996.

The response was to set up a special purpose vehicle, Manchester Millennium, which drew on the experiences in Manchester of public-private partnerships. It was able to draw on work for a City Centre Acton Plan and the Unitary Development Plan for the City where planners had already made a case for rethinking and redesigning the City Centre as a whole, looking at the identities and possible futures for streets and parts of the central area. Thus while the revival of the retail space was a priority, the need for wholesale reconstruction meant that a range of other measures aimed partly at improving confidence in the city centre could be implemented. The existence of a plan that had been through public consultation meant that planners could move quickly, assuming agreement on the strategic priorities (Kitchen, 2001).

The resultant 1996 Master plan devised by consultants EDAW had six strategic objectives. Rebuilding the retail core to make Manchester a strong regional centre was uppermost but also significant were others which saw the Centre’s role in terms of: leisure and culture; transport services; the public realm, with the notable creation of two new open spaces; and the possibilities of expanding the residential offer. The Plan was underpinned in statutory terms by supplementary planning guidance produced in 1997. It offered flexibility within a clear framework rather than a blueprint. Implementation was garnered through a special purpose vehicle, Task Force – Manchester Millennium Ltd, with representation from central and local government and the private sector. The partnership was underpinned by an initial four year funding package.

Many players contributed to the process and luck was important too. Central were Manchester City Council and the planning and urban design teams there, the latter notably an in-house team when other local authorities had diminished or outsourced such activity.4 Also significant were the decisions of investors, such as M&S to rebuild their major bomb-damaged store. The presence of large amounts of institutional investment and a nervous insurance industry affected the amount of resources that could be drawn down from central government too. Latterly, an expansion of higher

3 The development of a strategic frame that becomes embedded in the minds of the ruling political elite and senior officials is a feature of other successful redevelopments (Healey, 2007).

4 Birmingham and Sheffield City Councils were also able to draw on highly competent in-house urban design teams to successfully reshape their city centres in the 1990s and early 2000s, also drawing on masterplan-led approaches (see Punter, 2010).
education and associated buy-to-let speculation helped bring in property investment. We note also the significance of the planning team and the Chief Executive and leader of Manchester Council in getting cranes on the skyline and generating confidence, in part through promoting a vision that granted investors certainty. As the nominee of this case stated: “[The project demonstrated] that a major secondary city could regenerate and reinvent itself as a regional service and employment centre at a time when obituaries were being written for such places.”

Success

The success of the project lay in the planning and design of the new central area, in that it underpinned both a transformation in the way public space was used and relatedly, the success economically of the newly built shops and other businesses attracted to the central area. Architecturally the plans replaced a rather poor 1960s Arndale Centre with buildings of better quality, with more natural light internally and greater attention to external spaces. Part of this process created buildings and spaces for civic use and while there are criticisms that this process was partly a gentrifying one (for example Mellor, 2002), the spaces that resulted are generally considered much better than their predecessors (Hebbert, 2010). Economically success lay in turning around not just the immediate bombed area but also areas of nearby dereliction that were prominent previously and in turning some spaces that were threatening to some groups into more inclusive places, for example Piccadilly Gardens and the remodelling of the Corn Exchange, heavily damaged by the bomb, and reimagined as an upmarket destination (Mellor, 2002).

Innovation

The innovation here is in a combination of factors, but uppermost is the importance of how on-going planning and political work in the ten years leading up to the bomb enabled Manchester to react well and fast. This was underpinned by a belief in positive planning and urban design to work with economic forces but also to actively shape them. The belief in the power of positive planning and good design was underpinned by visits of the ruling elite to Barcelona in the early 1990s and learning from active participation in European networks such as Eurocities which highlighted how successful European cities were using positive, integrated planning, transport and urban design strategies to reinvent themselves. There was thus a general conversion to the benefits of confident planning and good urban design where the inherited legacy of Manchester’s architecture could be conserved and enhanced for economic gain in particular (Hebbert 2010).

This was confident local government in action underpinned by a sense of the value of place and space as a rich cultural inheritance. The stability of the governing regime and thus approach, which became known as the ‘Manchester Model’ of regeneration, from 1984 onwards was critical. There were only two leaders in the period under scrutiny here Graham Stringer 1984-96; and Richard Leese 1996-present. Howard Bernstein has been Chief Executive from 1998-present, and considered very powerful prior to this appointment (Hebbert, 2010). The high level of partnership working was also a feature that distinguished the Manchester story: while partnerships had been widely used from the early 1980s, this one worked better than most, going beyond a paternal business presence to genuine collaborative working but with strong leadership from local government.

Conclusion

The central retail area remains a highly successful place with a thriving retail core alongside civic and cultural buildings and a large inner city residential population. There are criticisms of the wider regeneration of the inner city with rather too much residential investment of poor quality (Hatherley, 2011). There is also criticism that this model of property led regeneration does not touch
rundown areas in close proximity. These are the general side-effects of a brand of municipal entrepreneurialism which Hatherley (2011) acknowledges Manchester has implemented with “total efficiency” when other cities merely dabbled.

The innovation in planning framework: Regeneration of central Manchester

![Regeneration of central Manchester Diagram](image)
Case study 4 – The Grainger Town Partnership

Description

This project began as a conservation-led regeneration of the classical core of 35 hectares of Newcastle City Centre, developed largely as a piece in the 1830s and 1840s. It later transformed into a wider economic, cultural and environmental regeneration project. The focus here is on the Grainger Town Partnership which formally existed between 1997 and 2005.

The area is of considerable architectural merit with 57 per cent of the buildings in the area being listed, 29 per cent of these at Grade I or II*. However, retailing in the area was struggling as the city’s retail centre shifted northwards and office activities relocated. Grainger Town was a largely forgotten space both lost between part of the area covered then by the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation and the monolithic shopping area of Eldon Square and suffering from a lack of strategy for it and the wider city centre as a whole.

A programme of property development and environmental enhancement was started in 1993 with Newcastle City Council and English Heritage. This tackled most of the worst buildings at risk and began to stop the decline of the area. The piecemeal nature of intervention was not considered adequate however and in 1996, EDAW were commissioned to produce a regeneration strategy and prepare a bid for Government funding. The aim of the project was to make Grainger Town a high quality environment appropriate to a major European regional capital. A total of £40 million of public money was initially committed to the Project, principally from the Single Regeneration Budget (£11 million) and English Partnerships/One North East (£25 million).

The project also features a Special Purpose Vehicle, the Grainger Town Partnership. However, this SPV had considerably less powers than equivalents in some of our cases. It was locally derived and relied on ‘soft power’: persuasion and negotiation in its approach to implementation. It was constituted as a company limited by guarantee, with a Partnership Board of 20 members, including representatives from the City Council, key public agencies, the private sector and local residents. Business and Residents Forums were also established, together with advisory panels. This building of a wider network plugged an obvious deficit in terms of representation of various publics in planning for this largely business-oriented area. Through dialogue with such groups the legitimacy of the activities of the Partnership could be garnered, in part to challenge if necessary the power base of the City Council. The project had a Delivery Team of officers, based within the area.

As in the Manchester city centre case a key concern was to generate confidence in the area. And also as in the Manchester case the underlying vision was one selectively derived from ideas of continental European best practice to provide vision and confidence for city centre investment. This was achieved principally through close dialogue with private sector investors and investment in the public realm. There was a particular focus on upper floors which were brought back into commercial and residential use. Early successes led to growing confidence and larger schemes were initiated. By the end of funding in March 2003, over £145 million of private sector investment had been secured, almost double the original target of £74 million, and much more came forward in the period after large-scale public sector funding ended.

Indeed a key feature of the project is the novel exit strategy. During the last two years of the Grainger Town Project the Partnership developed a Forward Strategy concerned with the delivery of the remaining projects and plans for succession. The regional development agency One North East and the City Council’s City Centre Development Team oversaw funding commitments to 2005, taking into account delays caused by EU funding issues. Several members of the Delivery Team, originally
seconded, returned to Council retaining some of their Grainger Town responsibilities and ensuring that the tacit knowledge accumulated during the Partnership could be retained. The Partnership Board was dissolved at the end of 2003 and a wider City Centre Panel was identified as the successor body to the Partnership. This Panel took charge of the Grainger Town Charter, which safeguarded design standards and agreed maintenance responsibilities of the City Council. A Grainger Town Maintenance Manual was also produced to encourage private owners to uphold standards.

Success

A number of reviews praised the project, for example: “The Grainger Town Project was an undoubted success. Economic decline was halted and the physical deterioration of the area tackled. ...Many buildings were restored and brought back into use ...By 2006, almost all the target outputs initially set for the Grainger Town Project had been met or exceeded. The successful regeneration of the area has been widely acknowledged and it has received a number of prestigious awards.” (Robinson and Zass-Ogilvie, 2010). An interesting feature was the enduring legacy left by the project, not just in terms of conservation of the built fabric and improvements to the public realm, but economically too. This success resulted in part from the carefully crafted institutional arrangements put in place after funding ceased: “Despite the economic downturn, vacancy rates in Grainger Town decreased between 2003 and 2009 – while increasing in the rest of the city centre. Rentals have also held up reasonably well. The residential population... has continued to grow: up from an estimated 998 in 2003 to 1455 in 2009. Improvements to the public realm...have generally been well maintained.” (Robinson and Zass-Ogilvie, 2010). The opening and retention of several shops and restaurants helped reinforce Newcastle City Centre’s position as the prime destination in the conurbation for leisure activity.

The regeneration of Grainger Town has created its own context through careful integration and sensitivity to structures, uses, layouts, anomalies of building form and detailing. Attention to detail, and the additional time required by such an approach to historic city fabric, has resulted in substantial rewards.
Innovation

The project was underpinned by a broad and diverse partnership between the City Council and a wide range of other stakeholders in which the City Council was influential but not in control. Its governance involved a Board reflecting a very wide stakeholder base supported by four influential advisory fora: a Business Forum, Residents Forum, Urban Design Panel and Arts and Culture Panels. This facilitated a high degree of learning particularly between public and private sector groups. The activities of the staff at the heart of the partnership to build a broad platform for action were key to this (de Magalhaes et al., 2002). The strength of the partnerships established during the initial phase allowed the project to continue following the end of the initial funding stream.

The second innovation was to use public investment in high quality urban design and place-making to give confidence to potential private sector investors. This investment in the streetscape enhanced the heritage dividend inherent in the architecture to generate investment in retail, office and residential development with under occupied space brought back into use. Finally, close attention to an exit strategy in terms of substance but also organisations and process was vital.

Conclusion

The Grainger Town Partnership turned around a declining part of Newcastle using, as in the Manchester case, the beauty and delight inherent in the architecture for economic gain as well as conservation. Engaging a wide range of stakeholders in the process to develop informal plans for the area was critical in inspiring confidence as was the use of high quality design to drive up standards for private sector investment. The success of the project has been limited after funding ceased due to the lack of a strategic plan (as in the Manchester case), and this is evidenced in an increase in vacant business units, although a closely worked through exit strategy helped mitigate the worst of the potential impacts.

The innovation in planning framework: Grainger Town
Case study 5 – Newhall, Essex

Description

Newhall is a new development on the edge of Harlow New Town. The site is greenfield with only limited connectivity to the main urban centre. In the 1990s the area was included in the Local Plan as an area suitable for development (Adams et al., 2010). The land was in the sole ownership of the Moen family who eschewed an easy option of selling off the land for development and took an active interest in the planning and development of the site.

The stated aim of the Newhall project was to engage in place making rather than the construction of just another suburb. The Moen family worked closely with Roger Evans Associates to create a masterplan and design code for the site which was then used to manage the development process. Overall the planning of the site adopted elements from the rest of Harlow New Town that planners felt had worked well: ‘green wedges’ between residential areas and neighbourhood centres within five minutes’ walk of dwellings. Newhall also avoided the worst aspects of the New Town such as the preponderance of cul-de-sacs and monotonous house design.

3D master plan of Newhall (source: http://www.studioreal.co.uk)

Success

There were several steps taken to ensure the development of diverse and liveable spaces. Firstly there was a strong and coherent design ethos which permeated everything that was done with the site. This was embodied in the ‘Book of Newhall’ which acts as a design-guide/manifesto for the development. It set the tone for the development and required developers to move beyond their standard house-types. The main risk with this sort of approach is that cost increases can make development unviable. This risk was taken on by the Moen family who, by taking the long term view, sought to increase the overall value of the site. The idea is that there will be a quality premium over the long term as a result of thought and planning at the early stage. Adams and Tiesdell (2013) have coined the term ‘patient capital’ to characterise the approach taken in this instance.

Secondly the development was divided into plots and put out to tender with different developers and architects. This approach has been used to great effect in many Northern European countries which often encourage individual differentiation in design. The result has been a series of strong and
distinctive architectural types. This approach was not without its problems. A number of mainstream volume house builders withdrew from the project due to the constraints imposed on design. The quality of the buildings both in terms of design and also their eco-credentials also increased the cost of developments. This was off-set by the value of the finished houses. This increase in quality and cost does however raise issues of affordability and social sustainability and risks such development further entrenching socio-spatial segregation in housing. In addition, whilst there was an ambition to create a master-plan for the development that ensured the development felt complete after each phase this has not been possible to achieve in reality. The first phase did not contain any of the amenities which give a development a sense of place. These only came with phase II of the development.

Innovation

The first innovation, which is in some ways a reinvention of an old approach, was to have a long term vision and retain landowner interest in the development. This had an impact on the business model for the site and as such required a longer term perspective to be taken. The idea was to create an identity for the development which could survive the development process and help create a sense of place. Simple steps were taken to achieve this aim. The overall street plan for the development took inspiration from classical town plans such as Venice, Bath and Florence. This provided a more human scale design than is typical in new greenfield housing developments with the focus on pedestrians (Evans, Undated). This priority for pedestrians also required a change of mind-set on the part of the Highways Authority and detailed negotiation to make this happen.

The approach to design and quality outlined above also lead to an innovation in the way the development tenders were approached with an architect-led approach adopted. In the first phase of development the developer was brought on board first with the architects introduced at a later stage. This was not completely successful as the conflict between financial returns and design quality did result in compromises being made. With subsequent phases of development the architects were the first to be brought on board with the developers then being asked to tender to deliver the designs produced by the architects.

This diversity of use was further enhanced through a novel approach to the commercial space within the development. Rather than having a zone set aside for employment use an: “...equivalent number of jobs will be created through finer-grained mixed uses (in plan and section) around the centres” (Evans, undated). This was done through a mixture of live/work units and commercial space on the ground floor of residential buildings along the main spine road of the development.

Conclusion

Overall the innovative approach outlined here resulted in an award winning and unique community. A focus on design, using different architects for different parts of the development alongside an area set aside for self-build was highly successful. Design codes and enlightened long-term land ownership were the key to delivering the design alongside an openness to learn, in this case from nearby which lessened the risk of inappropriate policy transfer.
### Understanding Phase
Learning from previous mistakes and planning for the long term.

### Innovation Phase
A strategic decision to forgo short term financial gain for longer term benefits.

### Adoption Phase
Attention to detail coupled with a strong guiding vision helped ensure the successful adoption of the project.

### Implementation Phase
Continuity of land ownership critical in implementing the innovations.

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<tr>
<th>Understanding Phase</th>
<th>Innovation Phase</th>
<th>Adoption Phase</th>
<th>Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landownership key to long term success</td>
<td>Confidence to rely on expert lead solution to deliver the overall ambition.</td>
<td>Reliance on expert advice</td>
<td>Market based measure of success, house prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using historical examples as inspiration and adapting techniques from other countries.</td>
<td>Clear documentary evidence of principles</td>
<td>Awards for project show best practice</td>
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Case study 6 – Gateshead Quays

Description

Gateshead Quays is a riverside regeneration project in North East England. Formally industrial land, the area suffered significantly from the decline in heavy industry and warehousing and fell into a state of decay and neglect. The area has subsequently found a new purpose as a ‘cultural quarter’ within Newcastle-Gateshead centred on the rejuvenated River Tyne.

The iconic structures which are the public face of the project are the Baltic Gallery, Millennium Bridge and the SAGE Music Centre. However, this is only the latest element of a history of investment in art and culture in Gateshead. The genesis for culture-led regeneration in Gateshead can be traced back to investment in public art, in part on land reclamation schemes from the 1970s onward. A Garden Festival in 1990 and more particularly the commissioning of the Angel of the North latterly put Gateshead more firmly on the cultural map. Those involved with the policy credit the success of the Angel with giving Gateshead the cultural capital and confidence to press ahead with an ever more ambitious project (Devlin, undated). The regeneration of the north bank of the Tyne, mostly through the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation was also critical in facilitating the development of the Gateshead side.

As well as the two iconic buildings around 4,600 new homes have been created in the vicinity of the Quayside. The developments have created an estimated 6,000 jobs in both the permanent institutions directly and in other developments such as the Baltic Business Quarter close by. The Business Quarter is attractive to business in part because of the ‘buzz’ and prestige created by having nationally significant cultural projects nearby. Such co-presence may lead to longer-term staff retention and image benefits viz locating in out of centre locations. The projects together have realised approximately £1 billion of private sector investment in relation to £120 million from the public sector.

Success

The regeneration of Gateshead Quays resulted from this history of investment in arts and culture which highlighted the significance of design, alongside long term planning and vision. Such vision was combined with a degree of flexibility which enabled the Council to take advantage of opportunities which arose as the project progressed. Indeed the Council was rather reserved in stating the potential scale of its ambitions early on in the regeneration process to keep land values low. An additional early change in the project plan was to separate the two anchor attractions, the Baltic and SAGE Gateshead. The space created between the two buildings was therefore available for events and other development projects. The Millennium Bridge was a significant piece in the regeneration project which again highlighted the design ambitions of the Council. The ‘winking eye’ bridge provided a link between the office centred regeneration on the Newcastle side of the river with the cultural assets on the Gateshead side. The stability in the leadership and among senior officers in the Council facilitated the long-term approach.
Innovation

Waterfront regeneration led by cultural facilities is not new. It is a well-trodden path from North American cities of the 1970s and 1980s, through Bilbao to the UK and elsewhere. The innovation here lies in the adoption of a *flexible approach* within a clear vision and belief that has produced some of the innovation. The Baltic for example was built not to house a particular collection but to be a place where art was produced and exhibited. Similarly the SAGE was never intended to be just a music venue. The initial idea was indeed to produce a world class concert venue and a home for the Northern Sinfonia Orchestra but it quickly morphed into something more. The SAGE project became as much about education and the development of a culture of music as it did about the venue itself. Both these approaches offer examples of how to overcome a potential problem with culture led regeneration: whose culture is being regenerated? Quite often accusations of gentrification can be levelled at regeneration projects as traditional local and regional identities are overwhelmed by ‘world class’ culture. As Bailey et al. (2007) note in a review of the Gateshead Quayside regeneration project: “These developments succeeded precisely because the local people took ownership of them, not as exclusive symbols of wealth but as sources of local pride that regenerated a local source of identity as much as they did the local economy.” (2007: 61).

Conclusion

The emphasis in Gateshead Quays has been on a long-term, flexible vision. The stability of the governing regime of officers and politicians has helped deliver this, as in the Manchester case earlier, but critical also was the prior activities of the Tyne and Wear Development Corporation, particularly across the river in Newcastle. The stable regime was able to develop a flexible approach
out of this legacy, having learnt from it as it evolved. Also in common with Manchester, an accent on **quality design and the use of artists and architects** is not new but Gateshead’s history of engagement shows in the quality of the resultant built environment. Gateshead’s investment in good design both of itself, in creating delight for citizens but also potential investors and residents, making it a socially and economically progressive approach.

The innovation in planning framework: Gateshead Quays

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<tr>
<th>Understanding Phase</th>
<th>Innovation Phase</th>
<th>Adoption Phase</th>
<th>Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity developed and built up over time</td>
<td>Combination of ideas borrowed from other cities and new ideas about culture</td>
<td>An incremental approach building on each success and learning from mistakes</td>
<td>Relationship with local, regional and national networks critical to implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Continuity in leadership through council structure
- A long term Culture Officer post critical to maintaining the capacity and knowledge gained
- A mix of learning from other cities overlaid with sensitivity to local cultural needs

Success measured through popular appeal and institutional recognition.
Case study 7 – Sherwood Energy Village, Nottinghamshire

Description

When both Ollerton Colliery and two local textile factories closed in the early 1990s there were fears for the future of the local community. In the case of the colliery, most redundant pits were passed to the Government’s regeneration agency, English Partnerships, who would oversee their remediation and sale or redevelopment. Ollerton Colliery was the exception to this rule.

Largely thanks to the vision of one man, Stan Crawford a former president of the National Union of Mineworkers in Nottinghamshire, a local community group, Sherwood Energy Village (SEV) was formed to take on the responsibility of regenerating the site. SEV was formed as a co-operative society and bought the site from British Coal for £50,000. What they bought was 150 acres of polluted ex-industrial land, a challenge for most developers. The aim of the project was to replace the jobs being lost at the colliery with new businesses across a more diverse spectrum of sectors. The vulnerability of having all your jobs in one or two industries highlighted the need to diversify the types of business and employment opportunities in the area. This diversity would then make the community more resilient to the vagaries of markets in the future. Sherwood Energy Village is a mixed use development with commercial and residential development within the site.

At the centre of the vision for Sherwood Energy Village was the idea of sustainability. To have a vision based not just on a narrow vision of providing jobs for the area but to also do so in an environmentally and socially sustainable way. In environmental terms, the development incorporated a sustainable urban drainage system and rainwater harvesting to provide the majority of the water for the buildings on site, often using the engineering knowledge and skills of miners retained as part of the project. In addition the overall aim was for the development to be carbon neutral. This was achieved through a combination of on-site renewable energy and through building-in energy efficiency such as making use of passive solar gain and designing very well insulated buildings.

Success

The commercial development was an undoubted success with many and varied tenants employing over 1,500 people by 2008 (RTPI, 2008). The effect of the environmental standards set out above has been to reduce the ongoing costs to the tenants of the business premises providing a degree of economic sustainability.

One obvious failure that cannot be avoided was that of SEV itself. SEV was not immune from the financial crisis and the organisation went into liquidation in 2009. At the time SEV were in the process of developing the construction of 196 eco-homes and were hit hard by the financial crisis. They were unable to sell the homes they were developing which resulted in the banks funding the project withdrawing finance. This does highlight the lack of resources, particularly financial resources, community groups such as this often have. This makes them particularly vulnerable to external shocks such as financial crisis.

Innovation

Whilst none of the individual components of this case study could be said to be innovative in their own right, this is an example of combinatorial innovation with a community group as the driving force insisting on a strong ecological sustainability ethic with long-term ownership and profits retained as a provident society. Thus the nature and manner of the development make this an
interesting and innovative case study. The failure of the community group perhaps also offers an insight into why this type of regeneration project is somewhat less common than could be expected. The commitment and complexity of the challenge, to oversee the remediation of a significant area of ex-industrial land and deliver the vision of a truly sustainable development, demonstrates what can be done.

The critical innovative decision was over land ownership, and the National Coal Board transferring the site to a community group. That the community group was able, through setting up a friendly society to govern the project, to develop and let the bulk of the commercial land on the site, and to high environmental standards, shows the potential for alternative ways of delivering development. In the future planners and others involved with and interest in community development need to develop ways of building such capacity and institutional support to enable any community to embark on a project such as Sherwood Energy Village.

Conclusion

Sherwood Energy Village is a fascinating case: a ‘success story’ that ends in financial liquidation seems unlikely. But this was a development achieved and managed by a community-led group for over 14 years in an area with relatively low market demand. To do this underpinned by strong social and environmental values demonstrates the potential for other models of land ownership and development.

The innovation in planning framework: Sherwood Energy Village
SECTION B: PLANS

Case study 8 – Hadrian’s Wall World Heritage Site Management Plan

Description

Hadrian’s Wall runs for 84 miles coast to coast across the north of England. The sheer scale of the site and the diversity of its surroundings make managing this World Heritage Site (WHS) a challenge. Built in the years following AD142, the wall stretches from the banks of the River Tyne at Wallsend (the Roman fort of Segedunum) to Ravenglass in the west. The project area of 1693 km² spans the counties of Cumbria, Northumberland and encompasses two local authorities in Tyne and Wear. The wall was designated a WHS in 1987 and a management plan, the first such management plan in the UK for a WHS, was produced in 1996. The plan has had two subsequent iterations and work is underway on a fourth edition.

It is a large and complex area with competing pressures on the land that were felt best resolved through a proactive, forward planning approach. These fell into two main categories: damage to the wall from tourism and farming; and the lack of a coordinated approach to management of the site and conserving the archaeology in particular.

The first management plan faced a number of challenges. There was no real guidance on what a heritage site management plan should cover. This was compounded by the complexity of ownership and the number of bodies involved in the management of the site, the variety of existing designation and statutory protection for parts of the site and the uncertain boundaries of the site resulting from the vague inscription by UNESCO when designating it. In addition, the Plan was not supported by extensive funding and the Plan was drawn up by a committee rather than through a well-resourced special purpose vehicle as in many of our other cases.
Prior to the Hadrian’s Wall Plan, the management of monuments such as this were primarily considered to issues for archaeological preservation on an individual site by site basis. The reports undertaken before the planning process encouraged the plan to consider the whole wall and its setting as a single entity which should be managed holistically. By the third iteration of the plan there was a coherent group of stakeholders who could do this from the bottom-up. Thus various interest groups coalesced around certain key issues and wrote the plan, coordinated by a steering group.

Success

It was recognised from the beginning of the planning process that the plan needed to go beyond managing the physical structure of the wall and the associated archaeological remains. There was a clear ambition to produce a holistic plan that addressed the full spectrum of issues facing the site. The management plan and the partnerships that have developed as a result of the planning process have secured a number of concrete benefits for the WHS that arguably would not have happened without the Plan and the understanding between partners that came with it. A good example of this is the long distance foot path running the length of the wall. There was significant opposition to the path initially from landowners and archaeologists, however the management plan process was used to overcome these fears and steps were taken to manage competing interests. A cycleway now also runs the length of the wall and a dedicated bus service runs its length for most of the year, reducing the impact of car travel on the site and permitting access for carless households.

The strength of the partnership was also highlighted in 2014 when the Hadrian’s Wall Trust, the organisation set up to manage the WHS, was forced to close due to budget cuts, first with the abolition of regional development agencies and then primarily with a withdrawal of funds from English Heritage. Nearly all the management functions have now been passed to the partners, particularly English Heritage. The management plan helps in this transition, providing continuity of objectives.

The management plan also had ambitious timescales. It was recognised that a long term approach was needed to deliver some of the outcomes. To that end the plan produced a series of aims to be addressed over a 30-year period as well as specific policies to be delivered during the initial five year management plan period. This combination of long term vision coupled with short term implementation was seen to be a successful strategy for the management plan by subsequent evaluations (Young, 2014, and Mason et al., 2003).

Innovation

One of the first tasks outlined in the management plan was to set out a clear definition of the extent to the site. This took the novel approach of including a variable buffer zone either side of the actual archaeological remains in the rural areas to protect not just the physical remains but also the setting and context of the site. The zone extends up to 6km where the landscape setting demands. The act of mapping the length of the wall and making such assessments was a considerable achievement.

Protection of the World Heritage Site and its setting has now been successfully written into statutory local plans for nearly all of its length. This was a considerable achievement as at the time the management plan was being developed there was no universal recognition of the importance of World Heritage Sites and need for their protection within the statutory planning process.

Recognition of the cultural value of the site to current and future generations that was also one of the management plans innovations. This did cause initial problems from those affected with
concerns raised about the ability of residents and farmers to maintain their livelihoods. These concerns were addressed through extensive dialogue during the consultation process (Young, 2014). Having established a baseline set of issue and policies, and built trust, through the first plan-making process, the second version of the plan was able to contain many more detailed policies. This highlights the benefits of taking an incremental approach to innovation within public policy. It is almost impossible to get it completely right the first time. Institutional space needs to be given for problems and issues, which will inevitably arise with the implementation of any new plan or project, to be worked out and solutions found.

Conclusion

The management plans for Hadrian’s Wall show innovation in both their inception, but also in process and content. The plans are themselves ambitious and comprehensive. Through attention to inclusion in plan-making processes they have united economic and conservation pressures and found win-win solutions. Trust was essential given that the management plan does not have any statutory authority and was entirely reliant on partners delivering its policies, especially prior to statutory development plans taking up some of the issues raised. But the creation of a trusted management vehicle was able to use ‘soft power’ to secure a better future for the Wall and the places and spaces around it.

The innovation in planning framework: Hadrian’s Wall World Heritage Site Management Plan
**Case study 9 - Marine spatial planning**

**Description**

Growing pressures faced by marine environments across the world have led to increasing calls for regulation. In 2009 the UK government passed the Marine and Coastal Access Act which for the first time introduced a form of spatial planning in to the UK marine environment. The system of marine spatial planning extends from the mean high water mark to 200 nautical miles offshore. The area is divided into two plan areas, inshore and offshore plan areas, each having its own spatial plan.

There are particular challenges when seeking to develop a spatial planning framework for the marine environment. Firstly, its physical nature is a challenge. There are three elements: the seabed; the water column; and the water surface. Each of these elements is in a constant state of flux and all need to be considered as part of the whole system. There are then issues of who makes the plans. There are various communities of interest within the marine environment from the fishing industry, conservation groups through to the oil and gas sector. What is lacking is a community of place. In contrast to terrestrial spatial planning were many land use planning decisions are made by local people there are no such structure available in the marine environment. There have been attempts to create placed based spatial plans which encompass the marine environment, for example Integrated Coastal Zone Management, but these have often been dominated by physical processes and land use management rather than place making and shaping.

The challenge therefore for marine spatial planning has been to introduce a transparent, evidence based governance structure which brings into the process the various communities of interest and perhaps develops novel ways of developing communities of place as well.

**Success**

Whilst not the first marine planning system in the world, the UK Marine Planning System (MSP) does offer lessons for spatial planning in general. What MSP in the UK aims to do is go beyond MSPs origins as a method of marine conservation management and manage the physical and cultural aspects of the marine environment.

The development of a national system was preceded by a series of detailed research exercises, most notably in relation to the Irish Sea, before the development of the full marine spatial planning system. There is also a parallel system of Marine Conservation Areas (MCA) which set out to protect specific ecosystems and National Parks and other protected area on land. Both the mainstream spatial planning system and the MCAs have at their heart a comprehensive system of consultation and engagement with as wide a spectrum of stakeholders as possible.

Marine spatial planning is designed to be grounded in scientific evidence whilst at the same time allowing stakeholders to introduce other forms of knowledge and evidence as well as their opinions and values, to help governance these complex environments. It is early days for marine spatial planning so it may not yet be possible to say for certain whether it will be success. However, the fact that there is a comprehensive planning system for the marine environment is a historic move.
Innovation

One of the main innovations marine spatial planning has introduced is the idea that marine planning should be done holistically using space and territory as a way to do this, overcoming the problems of planning solely by policy sectors such as fishing. This does not just mean looking at ecosystems and the use of the marine environment in a holistic way. It extends beyond that to mean the marine environment should be considered as a place, with social and cultural elements, that need to be managed as well. The Marine & Coastal Access Act makes it clear that it is about the: “…the quality of life and well-being of coastal communities” (HM Government, 2011, para 2.5.4), as well as the management of resources and stewardship of the ecology. The innovation in UK marine spatial planning has been to use a combination of terrestrial spatial planning methods and methods of marine spatial planning from other countries, most notably Australia, and combining them to create a planning system which is appropriate for the particular situation faced by the UK. The UK MSP system therefore includes Marine Protected Areas an idea directly imported from the Great Barrier Reef marine plan. It also includes stakeholder engagement and community participation methods taken from terrestrial planning.

Conclusion

There are parallels between this case study and others in this report concerned with conservation in some sense, especially Hadrian’s Wall and Grainger Town. In all cases space and place are used to anchor discussions about multiple, often competing, desires, needs and impacts. In all cases the planning system provides arenas where discussions can be had and solutions which, if not always to everyone’s satisfaction can be reached. MSP provides a mechanism by which the cumulative impacts of many land and sea based decisions can be considered and would appear to be an essential element for future environmental protection in pressured marine environments.

The innovation in planning framework: Marine spatial planning

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<tr>
<th>Understanding Phase</th>
<th>Innovation Phase</th>
<th>Adoption Phase</th>
<th>Implementation Phase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence based policy changes leading to a new understanding of the issues</td>
<td>Combining innovations in terrestrial planning with scientific knowledge innovations</td>
<td>Phased introduction to ‘learn-as-you-go’ with pilot projects</td>
<td>A little early to tell as first plan only just produced</td>
</tr>
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</table>

- Leadership from new institution, the MMO
- Arguably the legitimacy of MSP still to be established
- A wide range of stakeholders involved to bridge tacit/scientific knowledge divide.
- Part of international research network to share best practice
- Drawing on best practice from international examples i.e. Great Barrier Reef
**Case study 10 – TAYplan city-region planning**

**Description**

The TAYplan Strategic Development Plan is a statutory plan covering a large area of eastern Scotland, encompassing four local authority areas and over half a million people, one third of whom live in Dundee. It was adopted in 2012 and sets out a succinct and ambitious 20 year planning framework to direct local development plans and planning decisions and is intended to provide a positive land use strategy to attract and guide investment and provide certainty for inhabitants, decision-makers and investors.

The Plan was developed with extensive consultation. A broad range of community involvement techniques were used in the development of the plan, taking in media coverage, public information events, an online interactive questionnaire, community council briefings and secondary school workshops.

The Plan is very succinct. Stripping out title and end pages it amounts to 18 pages of principal content which detail eight policies derived from a single proposals map. The Plan is instantly usable for all sections of the community and provides an excellent basis to get people involved in a review, which began in 2013 with workshops in schools. The vision is rather generic, but the development of locational priorities for investment and an emphasis on conserving environmental assets and promoting low carbon development through planning are notable. The Plan is especially novel in integrating climate change resilience and adaptation measures with long-term planning strategy. It does this by considering the appropriateness of strategic development locations and setting out the parameters on their design and form. As a consequence issues such as avoiding development in areas of flood risk and coastal erosion are used to shape the overall strategy while policies are clear that where development is permitted sustainable urban drainage systems and responding to existing infrastructure, green and grey is required.

The vision and mapping appear to owe something of a debt to the also excellent National Planning Framework 2 for Scotland which also, in expounding a clear spatial strategy at the national level, provides useful context for this city-region level work. One missing element here is mention of how the Plan might address the social disparities inherent in any city-region despite the identification of this as a priority in the vision. Affordable housing and public transport priorities are for example given little attention but one could argue this is a matter for local plans.

**Success**

It is too early to judge the performance of the Plan itself. Rather what is of interest here is its *content in relation to climate change* as a driver for the location and form of development, and the *style of its production*, and the *concerted partnership working* between the four local authorities within the city region area as well as a range of other stakeholder organisations. The Plan shows the value of city-region scale planning. It was delivered on time and to budget, achieved through leadership, strong project management and good cooperation. There are lessons for other city-regions comprised of multiple local authorities. Transparency with partners ensured recognition of the plan across the city-region. This has enabled strategic development sites for housing and employment to be coordinated across a wide territory with transport links considered alongside in a strategic way. This provides a clear sense of priorities for national government, local plans and private sector investment.
Innovation

The innovation lies particularly in its *accessible style*. It has only 24 pages, offering just eight policies, a proposals map and a table of monitoring arrangements. It relies heavily on graphics and communicates ideas very well with maps, plans and diagrams. It is accompanied by a proposed action programme detailing how the Plan will be delivered. Overall, the document is a great example for plan makers to follow in creating accessible strategic plans of genuine vision, especially with regard to city-region scale planning.

A further innovation lies in its content with regard to being a strategy genuinely shaped by *climate change* and other environmental considerations. All plans pay lip service to these agendas but this Plan shows how it is driven fundamentally by such factors.

Conclusion

TAYplan shows the value of strategic planning, in this case at city-region scale. Its success and innovation lies in its selectivity on what is genuinely of strategic importance at this scale, focusing on allocating housing and employment land and thinking through the consequences of climate change both for land allocations and in more general terms. It is clearly expressed, selective and focused.

The innovation in planning framework: TAYplan city region planning
SECTION C: MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION

Case study 11 – Bristol City Council localism policy

Description

The planning system in England and Wales is historically based on a hierarchical system where each plan has to conform to the plan which precedes it in the hierarchy. This has been turned on its head in Bristol with the plans at the bottom informing the plans above them. Bristol has a distinctive and vibrant civic culture which has been used by the Council to develop this strong commitment to bottom-up planning.

Bristol has a long history, pre-dating the Coalition government’s localism agenda, of engaging with communities in place-making. For example, the Neighbourhood Planning Network, which is a network of around 45 neighbourhood groups from across Bristol, has acted as a coordinating body for community involvement in planning issues since 2006. This coordinated approach to neighbourhood planning helped secure a bottom-up approach to the local plan. Using the plans developed at the neighbourhood scale allowed local knowledge to be tapped to improve the statutory plan, for example smaller sites for development have been identified and a greater level of detail provided in neighbourhood plans than would be possible in the site allocations of the development plan.

Bristol has recognised the need to prioritise scarce resources which a range of support available to communities depending on their circumstances. Two criteria are used to determine how much support a community needs and how soon they need it. The first criteria is one of planning need, are there likely to be planning issues and pressures that will require community involvement in the near future? In certain circumstances there will be little if any undeveloped land and a stable community with the little prospect of any planning issues arising. In other areas there will be clear planning issues and pressures which will need addressing the near future. Second, the likely capacities (in terms of both financial and social capital) of communities will vary and this is assessed to determine the resources allocated by the Council.

Success

The coordinated approach to community consultation has helped develop a strong institutional capacity at the community level to enable a meaningful dialogue to take place. As such, the Bristol Neighbourhood Planning Network aims to: “…increase the confidence and effectiveness of community groups in engaging with the planning system by the exchange of information, skills, expertise and experience” (NPN, undated). This form of ‘advocacy planning’ in action promotes local democracy and goes some way to addressing the power imbalances present in society and reflected in the planning system. In addition, for developers there is a clear approach to take and a degree of certainty that the process of community consultation is being carried out rigorously.

The capacity building element in the network is perhaps the most successful element within the overall approach to neighbourhood planning. The NPN encourages groups to share knowledge and experience and offers a critical friend role to groups who want to build their capacity to engage with planning matters. There are some basic requirements that all groups must fulfil before they can join the network, to be open to all residents in their area; be transparent in their activities; elect representatives; and seek to represent a consensus view of the community. These requirements are echoed by the requirements for Neighbourhood Forums and seek to set out a minimum standard for community groups.
Innovation

Bristol Neighbourhood Network has been at the forefront of developing capacity in neighbourhood planning. By switching the hierarchy of local spatial planning around and building from the bottom-up, Bristol City Council and its partners in the Network have ensured neighbourhoods have gone beyond being purely consultative bodies and now actively participate in, and often lead, the planning process. Developers are encouraged to engage communities at the earliest point in the planning process. The network has helped developers engage communities in a way that goes beyond the usual consultation process. Having a protocol for the conduct of such pre-application community involvement gives the developer a degree of certainty there will be a conclusive outcome in a reasonable timescale. This in turn also gives communities the confidence and knowledge to engage with developers at a stage in the process where change and compromise is achievable and realistic.

Conclusion

For several decades planning has struggled with community engagement. We know that such engagement works best as part of a civic culture that isn’t just brought into play when consulting on an agenda determined by the priorities of local government such as the need to prepare a statutory plan. The actions of civil society and the local authority in Bristol show how a more ‘always-on’ form of engagement can enact a more people-oriented planning, and to positive economic, social and environmental ends. English examples of this are rare although there are examples in Europe such as Amsterdam and in North America, such as Vancouver and Seattle (see Healey, 2007, Sirianni, 2007). Bristol’s approach is relatively new and its evolution will be interesting, not least to see how far a new civic culture might be borne and indeed translate to other areas.

The innovation in planning framework: Bristol City Council localism policy

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A commitment to engage in truly collaborative planning without preferring an outcome</td>
<td>Reversing the perceived wisdom by starting at the bottom.</td>
<td>A structured approach to maximise resources</td>
<td>Competency and trust developed over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership from the Council which provided the confidence to relinquish control over spatial planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>All stakeholders now comfortable with the method</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control passed to communities to allow bottom-up planning</td>
<td>Networks developed to support the initiative including new technology</td>
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Case study 12: Reforming development management processes in Rugby

Description

In 2009, Rugby Borough Council decided to review its development management planning function. Customer satisfaction with the service provided by the Council was low and the pressure to deliver to central Government targets was taking its toll on staff morale. Rather than an incremental approach to change, the Council took the bold decision to undertake an ‘end-to-end’ review of how they delivered their statutory planning function. To this end, they employed external consultants to examine the process of development management from start to finish.

What the review found was a good deal of duplication in effort and a process which had developed over time with many tasks being done just because: “...that was the way they had always been done.” During the review it became apparent that the need to deliver a planning decision within the time limits set by Government was leading to some perverse outcomes. Higher levels of refusals were recorded as decisions were being made to satisfy a time limit when a further week or two discussions with the applicant could have resolved any outstanding issues. Once the whole process had been deconstructed it was put back together, eliminating the duplication. The first point of reference for the Council was legislation, what was actually required as part of the planning process and what was just done out of a sense of following previous practice. The second principal was to focus on the timescale relevant to the customer: that was the time between when they first had contact to the point at which there was no further need for the Council, that is, when the last planning condition had been discharged. The Council now tracks the time taken for a matter to proceed from the first enquiry to the point at which the Council signs off on a planning application.

Success

Following the ‘end-to-end’ review the Council sought to embed a new customer culture within the planning department. Planning officers opened a file and became responsible at the point the first contact was made with the Council even if that was just a drop-in enquiry. This reduced duplicated officer effort when the applicant followed up an enquiry with a full application. The review estimated officers wasted around a third of their time in duplicated effort of this sort.

Having a single point of contact and a single officer managing a case file also improved the pre-application process. Officers were able to guide applicants through the process and manage expectations from the first contact. Case officers are then responsible for all aspects of the process, such as consultations, site notices and committee reports. Simple tasks such as delivering neighbour consultation letters at the same time as the site visit has also eliminated a common source of conflict, the fact that neighbours claim they have not been consulted. Having a single case officer for each file has also meant junior members of staff have been able to undertake meaningful and detailed work appropriate to their experience which has had a knock on effect of boosting job satisfaction. This has resulted in the loss of a number of admin staff but it has allowed the department to absorb the budget cuts while maintaining frontline planning staff.

The results of the changes have been impressive. The number of applications withdrawn prior to a decision has fallen from an average of around 90 per annum to around 30. The number of refusals has also fallen significantly. The ‘end-to-end’ time taken for decisions has fallen from an average of 170 days to 85 days and the number of customer complaints has fallen from around 40 per annum to just four since the new process has been in place. In fact the team now regularly receive more letters of thanks and praise than complaints.
Innovation

The *focus on customer experience* has also allowed innovative ways of measuring success at the local level. The overall experience of a planning applicant is much more meaningful way to measure success than an abstract time limit for a part of the whole process. A simple change such as the switch to an ‘end-to-end’ measure of time taken to deal with a customer’s application has resulted in a changed culture within the planning team.

Through a focus on what the experience is for the applicant there have been other benefits for the Council. There has been a *resource saving* in terms of officer time and staff overheads. The shift to having officers undertaking all aspects of the case management has been successfully used in other service sectors Rugby Council has cut costs whilst at the same time improving planning officers job experience and satisfaction.

Conclusion

Austerity and local government cuts are forcing many local authorities to look to transform their practices, rather than undertake incremental review. Rugby provides one model to look to in this with regard to development management which not only delivers cost savings but the customer centred approach to working has improved citizen and officer satisfaction.\(^5\) It has also been an interesting way of responding to external, that is, central government performance metrics.

The innovation in planning framework: Reforming development management processes in Rugby

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\(^5\) Wolverhampton Council has undertaken a very similar transformation in its development management service with similar reports of both customer and employee satisfaction, see: [http://www.pas.gov.uk/documents/332612/6011533/How+Wolverhampton+City%E2%80%99s+planners+gain+respect+from+local+business/abc17b27-a7eb-4b77-a2d6-b52f37c8f981](http://www.pas.gov.uk/documents/332612/6011533/How+Wolverhampton+City%E2%80%99s+planners+gain+respect+from+local+business/abc17b27-a7eb-4b77-a2d6-b52f37c8f981)
CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions are borne out of our case analysis and are grouped into four as per the messages outlined in section one of the report: the planning system; promoting innovation; the importance of strategy and holistic thinking; and building capacity.

The planning system

1. The statutory planning system can be very useful, operating best when the political will exists to use it and to achieve clear goals.
2. Resources, particularly public money, are important to secure public goods and values.
3. Innovation and long term success of development is dramatically enhanced by taking a longer term approach to developing land.
4. Creating a new institutional space, such as through a special purpose vehicle (SPV) can be helpful, especially where institutional goals are clear.
5. Effective stakeholder involvement at an early stage and throughout any project or plan is often significant.

Over time the UK planning system has developed a set of tools to tackle planning issues. On the whole these can be very useful. There are of course problems associated with many of them – some are considered too expensive and bureaucratic to use regularly such as compulsory purchase orders. But when the political will and a mandate exists to mobilise them, coupled with the necessary resources, then the outcome can be highly successful, planning-led intervention. We see this clearly in the bigger project-oriented examples presented here such as the delivery of the London Olympics and its legacy, and in the rebuilding of Manchester city centre.

Many of our planning success stories also rest on enlightened, progressive, and notably long-term approaches to the use of land. At Newhall, a landowner wishing to leave a different built legacy to more typical suburban development has created a scheme of great public and indeed economic value. In Salford and Gateshead, the public sector bought land which enabled them to have a greater control over what development came forward with positive regeneration outcomes. At Sherwood, the disposal of land by the National Coal Board to a local community interest company resulted in a very socially, economically and environmentally innovative approach to providing commercial space on that land.

While the planning system and its institutions can be helpful, the creation of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) is often valuable, especially when wider public goals are clear. How the SPV is constituted is highly significant. We note that political legitimacy was embedded into all of our SPVs from the outset, in contrast to some other, historic SPVs such as mark one urban development corporations. Typically this meant high levels of local authority representation such as in the London Olympics; or in the case of the Grainger Town Partnership, bringing in a range of diverse stakeholders to create a body that was much more than the sum of its parts. Grainger Town also shows the value more generally of deep stakeholder engagement to confer not only political legitimacy but also to further the implementation of strategic goals. Such projects also show the value of escaping bureaucratic cultures and opening up to be more creative in addressing matters of place governance, rather than opting for ‘decide-announce-defend’ strategies which are all too prevalent in local authorities. That
said, one reason we received few nominations of plans in our study probably relates to the design of the planning system and its quasi-legal nature which forces planners into a silo and a defensive mindset that is hard to escape.

**Promoting innovation**

1. Experimentation and space for risk-taking is important. An organisation may not always get is right first time, there needs to be (political) space for a degree of failure.
2. Learn from good practice, from locally and beyond, but be reflective about what may be transferable.
3. A long history of attention to a subject – a place or plan – is important in generating the knowledge and relationships that lead to genuine transformation.
4. Innovation has to be managed: a process is needed to routinize and embed new thinking into practices.

As the earlier discussion highlighted much innovation in the mature policy system that is UK planning is of a combinatorial kind; deploying often well-used tools in new ways. In this, some space for experimentation, and indeed for learning and getting it wrong, is important. In cases as diverse as Hadrian’s Wall and Rugby we note a great deal of ‘learning through doing’ and indeed the value of starting with a blank sheet of paper in terms of generating new ideas and processes.

Many of our cases also showed the value of learning from other cases and contexts, some explicitly learnt from European exemplars such as Manchester and Grainger Town. But in all cases there was highly skilful translation work as ideas were adapted to local context and emerging trends.

We also note that innovation often stems from a deep engagement with a place or issue. ‘Slow planning’ often yields genuine transformation as ideas evolve to suit emerging opportunities. We see this clearly in Salford and Gateshead but even in the case of the Olympics much of the regeneration effort rested on twenty years of prior learning about what might work in this part of East London.

**Strategic and holistic**

1. A holistic (integrated, comprehensive) understanding of place helps to bring different issues together to overcome policy silos and secure public value beyond the planning system.
2. Projects work best when they are creatively framed with clear and consistent strategic goals but with flexibility in implementation.
3. Urban design, both in the detail of development, but also in wider master planning processes, especially articulated through codes and frameworks can be very important for success.

The planning system’s ability to work across policy sectors and provide strategic frameworks to address issues that are often overlooked by other policy sectors working in silos is clear. Place is shown time and time again in the cases herein to be useful as a way of addressing a range of issues.
holistically. This is particularly pronounced in the cases of Hadrian’s Wall and in emerging marine planning practices, wherein seemingly intractable demands on place assets can be resolved through strategic planning.

The creative framing of projects is also vital when taking such strategic, holistic approaches. Such frameworks need to be clear and consistent, reaching out to those beyond the immediate planning system, but also allow for flexibility in implementation. This approach was very apparent in the Manchester, Salford and Gateshead cases.

The importance of urban design is also critical in many of the cases. In articulating issues of public value design codes and frameworks can be useful such as at Newhall and in Grainger Town. The success of these cases rests on the quality of the built environment which results from careful attention to detail and allowing for creative responses to a clear design challenge.

**Building capacity**

1. How ideas are communicated is highly significant in securing support and legitimacy for action.

2. Paying attention to building a civic capacity to contribute and underpin place governance work is important for the knowledge and values it brings and for better implementation.

3. Technical skills and knowledge are vital. In our cases this is often provided by professional planners drawing on codified and tacit knowledge.

4. Public sector capacity is very important to facilitate deliberation about what might be done in a place and to carry the memory of what has been tried before.

The generation of institutional capacity to tackle planning issues is of course vital. In capacity-building work the way strategic ideas are communicated proves very significant. In TAYplan and in other cases we see how strong, consistent messages help people and organisations to buy-in to wider goals. While financial resources might be important this often rests more on having the right people in place at the right time but also careful attention to the communication of ideas; designers seem more likely to do this, both visually bit also in clear verbal messages.

Whilst our cases show innovation coming from individuals employed from a range of disciplines and in both private and public sectors, the capacity of the public sector is very important in two ways. In a technical sense planners and others who can envisage creative responses and have a good awareness of the potential of the tools available to them are vital. This is most visible in relation to design such as through the in-house teams in Gateshead and Manchester Councils, but it also depends heavily on surveyors and others who can think through financial models and questions of viability.

Paying attention to the construction of a civic capacity is also important. In Grainger Town for example, getting local businesses and residents engaged continuously on shaping their place paid dividends in terms of regeneration outcomes, as did Bristol City Council’s response to citizen demands for greater control of their neighbourhoods. The redesign of the planning function to underpin these changed values is a creative response that embeds a soft cultural change into the harder institutional design, making it more likely to successfully embed itself.
Concluding remarks

Our findings on planning success are confirmed by others such as John Landis (2011), who in his study of planning success in the US concluded with four central messages:

- pay attention to how the project is framed and presented;
- look to learn from other places (but be aware of the contexts for the original intervention and one’s own);
- mix clear overarching goals with an adequate degree of adaptability about implementation;
- invest in adaptable institutional capacity.

Many of Landis’ cases, and almost all of ours, also show that the public sector is vital in shaping, and sometimes creating, market pressures and demands to deliver public value (as is the case with innovation in other sectors, the state often plays a critical but largely neglected role, see Mazzucato, 2013). Earlier in this report we noted how performance metrics and austerity do not help the delivery of planning success in terms of public value. Austerity has in a small number of cases driven a degree of innovation as local authorities are forced into root and branch reviews of practices such as in the Rugby case (although other drivers were significant too). But austerity will likely limit future success too as local government in particular struggles to find the resources to do the capacity-building work, leading partnerships in particular, that pays off in the longer-term.

In addition, the current emphasis on narrow ‘viability’ (compared to say, a much deeper and broader understanding of local and city regional economies), is short-sighted and unproven. The cases presented here show that long-term economic viability and sustainability depends upon elements such as good design, which is itself likely to be socially and ecologically sound. Thus at Hadrian’s Wall and in the area of marine planning we see how sectoral approaches were damaging environments undermining the livelihoods of those involved variously in fishing, farming, tourism, and industry. Planning involves a place focus that allowed a cross-sectoral approach to be taken which results in long-term economic, environmental and socio-cultural benefit. When coupled, as in both these cases, with highly collaborative processes that engage the stakeholders in defining the problem and looking for management solutions better policies, outcomes and implementation resulted. The value that planning innovations typically deliver are greater than their economic contribution, although this can itself be considerable. The value created by planning is often hard to measure and goes beyond terms that economic measures can reasonably account for.

This report has thus shown how local economies, environments and social and cultural life are enriched through planning intervention. The case studies are the tip of an iceberg of everyday success in planning that originates in public, private and third sectors. They show that despite their diversity, common themes emerge which can guide future practice.
REFERENCES


Neighborhood Planning Network, Undated, About NPN [available at: http://www.bristolnpn.net/about-the-NPN/]


About the research

This report is based on research conducted for the RTPI by Geoff Vigar, Paul Cowie and Patsy Healey, at the Global Urban Research Unit, Newcastle University, funded through the RTPI's Small Projects Impact Research (SPIRe) scheme.

Further information

The report is available on the RTPI website at: www.rtpi.org.uk/spire

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